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I.

INTRODUCTION

Abuse was the pervasive theme of Washington teen Rebecca
Hedman's short life. "Becca," as she was known by her family, was
sexually abused by her natural mother. At the age of fifteen months,
Becca was placed in a foster home with the family that eventually
adopted her, the Hedmans. When she was five years old, Becca was
sexually abused by her older adopted brother. Her adoptive family
provided her with counseling to cope with her abusive past, and at the
age of twelve, she seemed to be adjusting well. In middle school,
however, Becca became involved with the "wrong crowd" and began
to rebel. Unable to handle her, her parents sent her to a state-run
Crisis Residential Center and then to a group home. At the group
home, Becca met older girls who introduced her to crack cocaine,
prostitution, and a life on the streets.
After running away from the group home for forty-seven days,
Becca returned home to her parents. They enrolled her in drug
counseling and, for a short time, she appeared to be getting her life
together. Her parents, still concerned about her drug habit, sent her
to a residential drug counseling clinic in Spokane, Washington. They
were under the impression that the staff of the clinic would call if she
ran away from the clinic. However, Becca ran away from the clinic
five times and her parents were never notified.
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In October 1993, during one of her runaway periods, Becca was
picked up on a Spokane street comer by a thirty-five year old man who
paid her fifty dollars for sex. Because Becca did not adequately satisfy
the man, he became enraged and demanded a refund. When she
refused, he grabbed a baseball bat and hit her in the back of the head
six times, killing her. He dumped her body in the Spokane River.'
It was Becca's short life and tragic death which spawned Washington's new legislation regarding runaway youths and the parents who
want to control them. Appropriately nicknamed the "Becca Bill,"
Senate Bill 5439 became law in Washington in July 1995.2 The Becca
Bill is the Legislature's attempt to accommodate frustrated parents'
demands for control over their children's lives. It provides for
detainment and court intervention into the lives of juveniles known as
"status offenders." Unlike juvenile delinquents, status offenders fall
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for actions which would
not be criminal if committed by an adult.3
This Comment gives a practical overview of the Becca Bill and its
provisions and addresses the potentially dangerous ramifications of the
bill. Part II of this Comment gives a brief history of the trends in
juvenile justice in this country, establishing a context for what led to
the Becca Bill's passage. Part II also introduces the Juvenile Justice

1. Kery Murakami, Would "Becca Bill" Have Saved Becca?-Named For Runaway Girl Who
Was Murdered, New Law Gives ParentsMore Control Over Kids, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 23,
1995, at Al.
2. Becca Bill, ch. 312, 1995 Wash. Laws 1319, amended by Becca Too Bill, ch. 133, 1996
Wash. Laws 426.
3. Status offenses include such things as running away, truancy, incorrigibility, disobedience
of parents, and being in danger of leading a idle and dissolute life. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(f) (1995) (asserting juvenile court jurisdiction over juveniles who are
truant, ungovernable, and endanger themselves); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3(9) (1995) (asserting
juvenile court jurisdiction over juveniles who are leading an immoral or vicious life and disobeying
their parents); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/3-3 (West 1992) (asserting juvenile court jurisdiction
over juveniles who are absent from home without consent of a parent). "Juvenile delinquents"
refers to juveniles convicted of criminal offenses. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 14-1-3(5) (1995)
("The term 'delinquent' when applied to a child shall mean ... any child-who has committed
any offense which, if committed by an adult whould constitute a felony ..
"); ARK. CODE ANN.
59-27-303(11) (Michie 1995) ("'Delinquent juvenile' means any juvenile.., who has committed
an act . . . which, if such act had been committed by an adult, would subject such adult to
prosecution... under the applicable criminal laws of this State .... ); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAWS
§ 371(5) (McKinney 1996) ("'Juvenile delinquent' means a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime."). Early
delinquency laws lumped delinquency and status offenses under one jurisdiction. See, e.g., Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 1, 1899 Ill. Laws 132.
For a thorough history on how status offense jurisdiction developed, see Peter D. Garlock,
"Wayward" Children and the Law, 1820-1900: The Genesis of the Status Offense Jurisdictionof the
Juvenile Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 341 (1979).
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and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, the first federal act

to mandate the deinstitutionalization of the status offender.
Part III of this Comment gives a brief history of Washington's
statutes dealing with status offenders. This section then outlines the
key portions of the Becca Bill, focusing primarily on the "lockup"
provision and new petitions available to parents in order to obtain
court intervention into the lives of their unmanageable children. Part
III also briefly discusses controversial portions of the Becca Bill that
were vetoed by Governor Lowry, as well as alternative bills that were
before the Washington Legislature.
Part IV of this Comment addresses potential problems with the
Becca Bill as enacted. This section discusses how the Bill is working,
one year after its passage, based primarily on reports by practitioners
who are attempting to carry out the law. Part IV then addresses
concerns about the potential loss of federal funding under the JJDP
Act of 1974, and discusses the extent that federal dollars provided to
Washington for enacting juvenile justice programs are placed in
jeopardy by the Becca Bill. Part IV also examines the practice of
"bootstrapping" juvenile status offenders into the criminal justice
system through the bill's contempt of court provisions.
This Comment concludes that not only is the Becca Bill not
working in practice, but that it represents a dangerous trend back to
the days of parens patriaeand excessive court intervention into the lives
of noncriminal youths. Close watch should be placed upon our
Legislature to ensure that even stronger laws to control noncriminal
juveniles are never passed, as well as to ensure that valuable federal
dollars are not further jeopardized. Additionally, advocates for
children's rights should be watchful that contempt provisions, now
more accessible to parents through the Becca Bill, are not used as a
way of bootstrapping a child into the criminal justice system.
II.

TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

A. Parens Patriae and the Rise of the Child-Savers
Around the turn of the century, a growing concern developed over
the apparent disintegration of our nation's youth. Out of a trend
referred to as the "child-saving" movement arose a new way of looking
at the plight of juveniles who misbehaved. 4 These children were seen
as young human beings to be rehabilitated, rather than criminals to be

4. See geneTally ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969).
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punished.5 The goal of the juvenile courts was a benevolent one: to
save the children. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago
in 1899 to implement this lofty ideal. 6 By 1920, all but three states
had established a juvenile court system.'
The creators of the juvenile courts envisioned a kinder, gentler
court which would relax the formalism and constitutional protections
of the adult courts in order to allow a judge to discern what was
troubling a child.' The proceeding was viewed as civil rather than
criminal.9 In order to meet the "best interests of the child," intervention was to be informal and individualized.10
The child-savers
believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was
"guilty" or "innocent" but rather
to find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it
learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality, to take
him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade
but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a
criminal but a worthy citizen.1"
The authority under which the child-savers believed they could do this
2
was the doctrine of parens patriae."
The phrase literally means
"parent of the country."1 3
The doctrine of parens patriae developed in medieval English
courts of chancery.14 The major issues in the medieval courts
involved the distribution of property and testamentary and guardianship problems. 5 Chancery, acting as an agent of the monarchy, used
the doctrine to authorize involvement in the family in the interest of
maintaining the fuedal structure. 6

5. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
6. Id. at 107. See generally Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 I11. Laws 131.
7. Thomas R. Bearrows, Status Offenders and the Juvenile Court, in 2 FROM CHILDREN TO
CITIZENS, 176, 178 (Francis X. Hartmann, ed. 1987). Washington's juvenile court was
established in 1905. Act of Feb. 15, 1905, ch. 18, 1905 Wash. Laws 34.
8. Mack, supra note 5, at 107.
9. Id. at 109.
10. Id. at 107.
11. Id.
12. See generally Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens
Patriae," 22 S.C. L. REV. 147 (1970).
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (6th ed. 1990).
14. See generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to The Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 205 (1970).
15. Id. at 208.
16. Id.
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The first American court to use the doctrine of parens patriae was
a Pennsylvania court in the case of Ex parte Crouse. 7 In Crouse, a

girl was committed to a "House of Refuge."' 8

The girl's father

petitioned for habeas corpus to have her released from the house and
the court denied the petition.' 9 In an historic opinion, the court used
the term parens patriae,previously used only in dealing with property
interests in feudal England, to justify the further detention of the girl
in the House of Refuge. 20 The court stated:
To this end, may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task
of education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parenspatriae,
or common guardian of the community? It is to be remembered
that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge
of its members,
and that, of strict right, the business of education
21
belongs to it.

The Crouse court thereby transformed a doctrine used in medieval
England into a "new" doctrine, which was fully embraced by the
creators of the juvenile court.2 2 The doctrine provided a rather
murky justification for state intervention into the lives of children.
Because the state considered that it had a profound interest in seeing
that its children grew up to be moral, virtuous, and productive
members of society, it utilized the parenspatriae doctrine to fulfill this
23
goal.
Parenspatriae provided a rationale for juvenile court jurisdiction
over criminal and noncriminal offenders. The juvenile courts' reach

17. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1838).
18. Id. at 9. The opinion implies that the young woman's mother had her committed to the
House of Refuge because "her vicious conduct, has rendered her control beyond the power of the
said complainant, and made it manifestly requisite that from regard to the moral and future
welfare of the said infant she should be placed under the guardianship of the managers of the
House of Refuge..
Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id.at 11.
21. Id.
22. Rendleman, supra note 14, at 219.
23. Id. at 222. Parens patriae has been used in Washington, as in other states, as a
justification for a wide variety of state action. See, e.g., In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 22 857
P.2d 989, 998 (1993) (using the doctrine to justify the sexually violent predator statute and the
detainment of the mentally ill); In re the Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562, 567, 815
P.2d 277, 281 (1991) (justifying the removal of a child from his unfit parents); Converse v. State
Lottery Commission, 56 Wash. App. 431, 436, 783 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1989) (extending thestate's
parens patriae power to justify giving out lottery winnings in installments in order to insulate
lottery winners "from their own human frailties and the possible excesses to which they might be
subjected").
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extended to all children in danger of leading a societally unacceptable
life, regardless of whether or not they had committed a crime.
B.

In re Gault and Its Influence: Parens Patriae Questioned

While the child-saving movement may have grown out of the best
of intentions, the juvenile court soon fell under criticism for causing
children to suffer the worst of both worlds.2 4 Because of the informality of court proceedings, constitutional safeguards were often relaxed
or altogether abandoned.2 5 In addition, children under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court were not undergoing the expected transformation into virtuous citizens.26 In essence, the child-savers were neither
fulfilling their role as rehabilitators, nor providing procedural safeguards to ensure the integrity of the court process. 7
Although the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme
went unchecked for many decades,2" in 1967 the United States
Supreme Court sharply criticized many of the juvenile theories and
practices of the last sixty years when it decided In re Gault.2 9 In an

24. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
25. See, e.g., In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 605 (Pa. 1954) (holding that "Juvenile Courts are
not criminal courts, the constitutional rights granted to persons accused of a crime are not
applicable to children brought before them..."); Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 338, 146 P.
623, 625 (1915) (holding that a restraint without a warrant under the Juvenile Delinquency Act
does not violate due process).
26. See Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Children'sConstitutional
Rights: Implicationsfor the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199, 226
(1992).
27. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-556. The Kent court stated:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies
and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance
measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the
process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.
Id. at 555.
28. Challenges to the courts' unlimited discretion, when raised, were generally defeated
without much discussion in the early years of the juvenile courts. The discretionary approach was
hailed as indispensable in promoting rehabilitation. See, e.g., In re Broughton, 158 N.W. 884,
886 (Mich. 1916) (holding that in a delinquency proceeding, a juvenile court judge has complete
discretion in deciding whether to send an unmanageable and wayward child to the State Industrial
School); People v. Lewis, 238 N.Y.S.2d 792, 798 (1962) ("[A]n alleged delinquent should be
amenable to the court's jurisdiction with a minimum of legal technicalities."); Holmes, 109 A.2d
at 605..
29. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The facts of Gault illustrate how theories of juvenile
justice and parens patriaeoften lead to unjust results. Gerald Gault, a boy of fifteen, was arrested
for making obscene phone calls with his friend. His parents were not notified of his arrest and
he was permitted to be questioned by the police outside the presence of his parents. At a hearing
to determine his sentence, the arresting officer filed a petition with the court stating that "said
minor is under the age of eighteen years, and is in need of the protection of this Honorable
Court." The arresting officer failed to make reference to any factual basis for the initiated judicial

1996]

Becca Bill

influential decision, the Gault court specifically addressed the appalling
lack of due process given to juveniles and concluded that" . . . neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."3 Additionally, the court attacked the use of parens patriae as
a justification for depriving juveniles of constitutional safeguards when
it stated:
The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme;
but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where,
however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco
parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the
person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the
history of criminal jurisprudence.31
Although the Gault decision signaled the development of a new trend
that recognized the constitutional rights of children,32 the beneficiaries
of Gault have proven to be only criminal youths.33
In the last thirty years, juvenile justice has afforded juvenile
delinquents almost all of the protections of adults in criminal proceedings.34 Similar protections, however, are not always provided to status
offenders. Because their actions are not criminal, the push to afford

action. At the hearing, the complainant was not there, no one was sworn in, no transcript or
recording was made, no record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State
Industrial School until the age of 21. The sentence for an adult found to have made similar phone
calls would have been fifty dollars or imprisonment not to exceed two months. Id. at 4-9.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 16. Cf. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555 (holding that "the State is parens patriae rather than
prosecuting attorney and judge. But the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not
an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.").
32. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970) (holding that civil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile
courts. Also, all elements of a crime need to be established beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed
v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (determining the applicability of constitutional rights in
juvenile proceedings requires that courts eschew the "civil" label of convenience which has been
attached to juvenile proceedings).
33. Erin M. Smith, In a Child's Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve Procedural
Due Process, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 253, 257 (1992) (asserting that because status offenders were not
included in the Gault decision, parens patriae has continued to be a basis for providing them
fewer protections); Rayna Hardee Bomar, The Incarcerationof the Status Offender, 18 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 713, 717 (1988) (asserting that status offenders are still subject to the unbridled
discretion of the juvenile court).
34. Juveniles in criminal proceedings are entitled to all due process protections except the
right to a public trial or a trial by jury, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), the
right to bail, or the right to indictment by a grand jury, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555

(1966).
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the status offender due process rights has not been as strong. There
is still a prevailing sense that the status offender is a different breed
than the criminal offender.3 5 As a result of lingering "child-saving"
theories that deal with status offenders, certain constitutional protections have been held inapplicable to status offenders.3 6
C. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
While the revolution to recognize protections for status offenders
has not progressed as rapidly as for criminal juveniles, their situation
has not gone completely unnoticed. In reaction to states' tendency to
lock up truants, runaways and incorrigibles who had committed no
crime, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven7
tion Act (JJDP Act) in 1974.1
Passage of the JJDP Act was prompted by national concern over
widespread abuses and deficiencies in state juvenile justice systems.38
Specifically, Congress found a widespread practice of using state and
local correctional agencies and institutions to confine juveniles accused
of noncriminal offenses.39 In 1974, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals observed that at least
fifty percent of detention populations were juveniles who had committed no crime, but were held in secure facilities under deplorable
conditions.4 ° The appointed Commission further found that as a

35. See Evelyn C. Knauerhase, The Federal Circle Game: The PrecariousConstitutional Status
of Status Offenders, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 31, 32 (1990) (suggesting that status offenders are often
unfairly trapped in a circle of changing policies by Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency prevention); In re Ronald S., 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1977) (The status offender "was a judicial nightmare. He resented being in court. He
had violated no law. He usually just did not get along with his parents and, when one met the
parents, this was often completely understandable.").
36. See, e.g., In re Cindy Ann Spalding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975). The juvenile in the
Spalding case was found to be a "Child in Need of Supervision" because she engaged in acts of
sexual intercourse. She attempted to assert her right against self-incrimination but was denied
that right because the proceedings in which she was charged would not have been criminal if she
had been an adult. Id.
37. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1112
(1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-39 (1995)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1995) (addressing the congressional findings regarding the nation's
juvenile justice programs).
39. For a discussion of what led to the JJDP Act's passage, see Jan C. Costello and Nancy
L. Worthington, IncarceratingStatus Offenders: Attempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, 50-58 (1981).
40. KATHLEEN KOSITZKY CRANK, THE JJDP ACT MANDATES: RATIONALE AND
SUMMARY, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, FACT SHEET #22
(JAN. 1995).
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result of jail or lockup experience, juveniles often learned antisocial
behavior.4 1
A major objective of the JJDP Act was to ensure that noncriminal
youths not be incarcerated and that community-based voluntary
services be used in the place of detention and lockups. Congress made
federal funding for state juvenile justice programs contingent upon
meeting the mandates of the JJDP Act.42 Specifically, with regard to
status offenders, Congress required that each state "provide within
three years after submission of the initial plan that juveniles who are
charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be
criminal if committed by an adult . . . shall not be placed in secure
detention facilities or secure correctional facilities."43 Thus, in order
to receive federal monies through the formula grants program aimed at
correcting the deprivation of status offenders' liberties, the state must
show compliance with the JJDP Act's mandates.44

III.

WASHINGTON'S TREATMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS

A. From 1891 to the Present
While concern for and punishment of status offenders has existed
since biblical times,4" Washington, like many states, has never quite
decided to what extent court intervention into the lives of these unruly
yet noncriminal juveniles is appropriate. Washington laws allowing for
intervention have changed over the years. Many of the changes have
been consistent with national trends in juvenile justice.4 6
The first status offense law in Washington was simply worded,
authorizing the commitment of "incorrigible," "mendicant" and

41. Id. at 2.

42. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1995).
43. Id. The provision, as amended in 1980, does make an exception for a noncriminal youth
who is in violation of a valid court order. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96509, 94 Stat. 2750 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (1995)). See also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION

& AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION, JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE

STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (recommending not only
the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, but complete lack of juvenile court jurisdiction over

them).
44. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303 (1995).
45. If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, who will not obey the voice of his
father or the voice of his mother, and, though they chastise him, will not give heed to
them, then his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the
elders of his city at the gate of the place where he lives .... Then all the men of the
city shall stone him to death....
Deuteronomy 21:18-21.
46. See supra notes 4-36 and accompanying text.
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"vagrant" children to state institutions.47 In 1905, consistent with the
child-saving movement,4" Washington extended its status offense
jurisdiction to include an extensive array of undesirable youthful
activity. 49 In 1913, the list of prohibited acts was further expanded. o Any child deemed to be in violation of these statutes would fall
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In 1961, the Legislature
amended the scope and severity of the 1913 legislation, but kept eight
status offenses on the books.51 All of these early statutes, in keeping
with the national trend of parens patriae, allowed for secure detention
of juveniles found in violation. 2
The most sweeping reform in Washington's juvenile justice
system came in 1977, following the Gault decision and the enactment
of the JJDP Act. Washington became a leader among states in
implementing laws to deinstitutionalize the status offender.5 3 The
new legislation emphasized voluntary services coordinated through the

47. Act of March 7, 1891, ch. 103, 1891 Wash. Laws 195 (no longer in effect).
48. See generally Platt, supra note 4.
49. The legislation permitted the institutionalization of a child under age 17,
who is incorrigable [sic]; or who knowingly associates or lives with thieves, vicious,
immoral or disreputable persons; or who is growing up in idleness or crime; or
habitually begs or receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame; or who
knowingly visits or enters a house of ill repute; or who knowingly patronizes or visits
any policy shop or place where any gambling device is or shall be operated; or who
patronizes or visits any saloon or dram shop where intoxicating liquors are sold; or who
patronizes or visits any public pool room or bucket shop; or who wanders about the
streets in the night time without being on any lawful business or occupation; or who
habitually wanders about any railroad yards or tracks, or jumps or hooks onto any
moving train, or enters any car or engine without any lawful authority; or who
habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language; or is guilty of
immoral conduct in any public place, or about any school house; and any child under
the age of eight years who is found peddling or selling any articles; or singing or playing
any musical instrument upon the street, or giving any public entertainment.
Act of Feb. 15, 1905, ch. 18, § 1, 1905 Wash. Laws 34 (repealed 1909).
50. Act of Mar. 2, 1913, ch. 160, 1913 Wash. Laws 520 (amended 1961). Some of the new
categories included "incorrigibility" and being "in danger of growing up to lead an idle, dissolute
or immoral life." §§1(12), 1(16).
51. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 302, 1961 Wash. Laws 2473 (repealed 1977).
52. The 1891 law permitted detainment in the state reform school until the age of 18. Act
of Mar. 7, 1891, ch. 103, § 7, 1891 Wash. Laws. 197 (no longer in effect). The 1961 law
permitted detention for up to 72 hours, excluding Sundays and holidays, without a court order,
and unlimited detention with a court order. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 302, § 2, 1961 Wash. Laws
2473 (amending 1913 Wash. Laws, ch. 160, § 8).
For an extensive discussion of Washington's status offense law evolution, see Thomas
Neville, Washington'sJuvenile Status Offense Laws, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 170 (1978).
53. Neville, supra note 52, at 195.
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Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and released status
offenders from lockup facilities.3 4
DSHS was given the responsibility and authority to provide
services to the runaway population through a voluntary system of
community-based social services centered around nonsecure Crisis
Residential Centers (CRCs)."5 With the 1977 changes in juvenile
legislation, Washington was in full compliance with the JJDP Act, and6
was able to receive money through the formula grants program.1
Although the 1977 changes were hailed as moving in a positive
direction for the treatment of status offenders, its implementation left
many citizens and lawmakers disappointed.57
The Need For a Change
In 1994, Governor Mike Lowry appointed the Council on
Families, Youth and Justice to conduct a comprehensive review of the
1977 Juvenile Justice Act." The Council analyzed the 1977 laws in
terms of original goals and results to date, and proposed recommendations for changes.5 9 The Council's report saw the problems with the
1977 legislation as: a lack of CRC facilities, the ineffectiveness of
Family Reconciliation Services because of their voluntary nature, and
a lack of secure placement alternatives to improve the effectiveness of
the process.6" The Council recommended the use of a Child in Need
of Services designation for runaway youth, as well as court authority
to order services to families in need. 61
In addition to the Council's recommendations, another catalyst for
the change in legislation were vocal parental rights groups. Parents
B.

54. See generally Family Reconciliation Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A (1993), amended
by WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A (Supp. 1995).
55. CRCs were to be nonsecure and adhere to the mandates of the JJDP Act. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.32A.030 (1993), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A (Supp. 1995).
56. Letter from John J. Wilson, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department of Justice, to
Rosalie McHale, Program Coordinator, Juvenile Justice Section, Department of Social and Health
Services (May 2, 1995) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
57. Revising Proceduresfor Non-offender At-Risk Youth and Their Families, 1995: Senate
Floor Debates on SB 5439, 54th Leg. (1995). "All of us have heard about the breakdown of the
family in this nation ... laws can contribute to that problem ... and the 1977 Juvenile Justice
Act contributed to that problem." Id. (statement of Senator Hargrove).
58. COUNCIL ON FAMILIES, YOUTH AND JUSTICE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).

59. Id. at 6. The council was divided up into four work-groups: The Dependency Work
Group, the Youth in Crisis Work Group, the Juvenile Offenders Work Group, and the
Prevention Strategies Work Group. The Youth in Crisis Work Group was responsible for
evaluating the current provisions for dealing with at-risk youth and runaways. Id.
60. Id. at 23-31.
61. Id. at 25-36.
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were frustrated with a perceived lack of power over their runaway
teens, and wanted those teens to be subject to stricter laws and
incarceration periods for running away.6 2 When the 1995 legislative
session began, five bills were on the table, each a variation on the
theme of the Council's recommendation.63 The Becca Bill, the one
eventually passed and signed, is outlined below.
C. The Becca Bill
The reach of the Becca Bill is extensive. Most of the Bill's
provisions amend the "Family Reconciliation Act."'6 4 Additionally,
the Bill amends certain sections of titles 71 and 28A of the Revised
Code of Washington, providing for strict enforcement of truancy laws
and allowing for the involuntary commitment of minors to drug,
alcohol, and mental health treatment.6 5 While the truancy and
involuntary commitment sections are quite controversial, this section
on the Bill's main provisions will deal only with revisions to the
"Family Reconciliation Act," specifically addressing the lockup
provision now available to incarcerate runaways, as well as court
petitions created to give parents "tools" to control their children.6 6

62. A form letter distributed by one concerned parent to the Legislature and the Attorney
General's office stated:
I am angry that the law does not give the parent the right to protect their children. I'm
angry that there are no consequences for the runaway, such as fines... detention, or
truancy officer.... I'm angry that lock up treatment isnot available in Washington.
I'm angry because I make phone calls every day to our hired help in Olympia and it's
very rare I even get a call back, so I've decided to try sending a letter.
Letter from Kristi Vanselow to The Office of the Attorney General (Feb. 21, 1994) (on file with
the Seattle University Law Review).
63. The five alternative bills were Senate Bill 5439, Senate Bill 5480, Senate Bill 5649, Senate
Bill 5191, and House Bill 1417; 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A (1993), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A (Supp.
1995).
65. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.095 (Supp. 1995) (providing that "the parent of
any minor child may apply to an approved treatment program for the admission of his or her
minor child for purposes authorized in this chapter. The consent of the minor child shall not be
required for the application or admission.)"; WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.225.030 (Supp. 1995)
(providing that "upon the fifth unexcused absence by a child within any month during the current
school year, the school district shall file a petition with the juvenile alleging a violation of RCW
28A.225.010. ..").
66. The Becca Bill as enacted in 1995 was further amended by the 1996 Legislature. Becca
Too Bill, ch. 133, 1996 Wash. Laws 426. This section will discuss the Becca Bill as the
legislation was amended by the 1996 session.
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1.

The Statement of Legislative Intent

The intent provision of the new law recognizes the needs of
families facing the problems of an out-of-control or runaway youth.
The Legislature found that there was a need for a system to assist
children and parents in conflict, and that parents were not sufficiently
informed of their rights regarding their children. 67 Furthermore,
because chronic runaways put themselves at serious risk, the Legislature concluded that secure facilities must be provided to help parents
68
protect their children and to aid children in protecting themselves.
Overall, the Legislature determined that the new law should protect,
treat and stabilize children and empower parents by providing them
with the assistance they need to raise their children.69 The following
sections detail how the Legislature envisioned these goals would be
carried out.
2.

Police Intervention and Secure CRCs

One of the most controversial aspects of the Becca Bill, differentiating it from the old law, is the provision which permits detention of
status offenders in secure CRCs. The Becca Bill authorizes a police
officer to take a child into custody if the officer is told by a parent, an
agency in charge of caring for the child, or the juvenile court that he
or she is absent from home or placement without consent or in
violation of court order.7" A police officer may also act on his or her
own volition to take a child into custody if the police officer reasonably
believes the child is in danger, taking into account the time of day and
location of the child.71 The duration of police custody, in both the
old and new provisions, is limited to the amount of time necessary to
transport the child from the place picked up to a destination authorized
by law.72
The Becca Bill also re-prioritizes what police options are regarding
where the police may take the child. Under the new provision, the
police officer is required to take a runaway child back to his or her
73
parents' home or their place of employment as a first alternative.
If the parents do not wish the child to remain in the home, they may

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

WASH.
Id.
Id.
WASH.
WASH.
WASH.
WASH,

REV. CODE § 13.32A.010 (Supp. 1995).

REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.

CODE § 13.32A.050(1)(a),(c),(d).
CODE § 13.32A.050(1)(b).
CODE § 13.32A.050(2).
CODE § 13.32A.060(1)(a).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 20:125

request the officer to place the child with a relative, responsible adult,
or at a licensed youth shelter.74
The officer must take the child to a secure CRC under this
sections if the child is either afraid to go home (indicating abuse),7 6
if it is not practical to take the child home, or if there is no parent
available to accept custody of the child.77 Secure CRCs are defined
by the Becca Bill as "a crisis residential center, or portion thereof, that
has locking doors, locking windows, or a secured perimeter, designed
and operated to prevent a child from leaving without permission of the
facility staff. ' 7 Secure CRCs are intended to increase the safety of
children and provide assessment and treatment of children in an
atmosphere of concern, care, and respect for children in the CRC and
their parents.7 9 Officers must make a written report to the CRC
within twenty-four hours after taking a child to a CRC, describing the
reasons the officer took the child into custody.8 0
When the child is admitted to a secure CRC, the administrator is
required to hold the child there for at least twenty-four hours, but not
for more than five days.8 The CRC administrator is required to
notify the parent and the department of the child's placement in the
CRC. 2 A child may be removed at any time from the secure CRC
if a parent comes to pick him or her up."
Upon the arrival of each child at the CRC, the administrator is
required to conduct an assessment." The assessment is designed to
determine if the child needs to remain in the secure facility or can be
transferred to a semisecure facility, based on a variety of factors.s

74. Id.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.060(2).
76. The Becca Bill contains several provisions to ensure that abused children are not handled

under its guidelines, but under the dependency statutes as intended. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.32A.010.
77. WASH. REV.
78. WASH. REV.
79. WASH. REV.
80. WASH. REV.
81. WASH. REV.
82. WASH. REV.

CODE § 13.32A.060(1)(b)(ii)-(iii).

13.32A.030(12).
§ 13.32A.010.

CODE §

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

§ 13.32A.050(3).
§ 13.32A.130(1).
§ 13.32A.090(2)(a).

83. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.130(5).
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.130(2)(a)(i).

85. The factors to be considered are the age and maturity of the child; the condition of the
child on arrival at the center; the circumstances that led to the child being taken to the center;
whether the child's behavior endangers the health, safety or welfare of the child or another; the
child's history of running away which has endangered the health, safety, and welfare of the child;
and the child's willingness to cooperate in conducting the assessment. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.32A.130(2)(a)(ii)(A)-(F) (1996).
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The administrator must notify DSHS of the child's placement 6 and,
regardless of transfers between secure and semisecure facilities, the total
time of placement is not to exceed five days. 7 If a child runs away
from a CRC, whether secure or semisecure, the administrator must
notify the parents and the appropriate law enforcement agency
immediately.8 8
The focus of the CRC stay is treatment, not punishment. A
multidisciplinary team, whose purpose is to assist in a coordinated
referral of the family to available social and health-related services,8 9
may be convened by the administrator of the CRC, if she has reason
to believe the child is in need of services.9" In summary, the CRC,
police intervention procedures and the secure detention facilities are
designed to create a window of opportunity during which the parent
and child may reestablish contact and agree upon a place where the
child will live. The emphasis at this stage is on voluntary services and
reconciliation. Court intervention is still viewed as a last resort.
3.

Children in Need of Services and At-Risk Youths

Even though intervention is designed to
reconciliation, the Legislature created tools to
reconciliation is not possible. Child in Need
petitions and At-Risk Youth (ARY) petitions
CHINS is defined as a juvenile:

encourage voluntary
be used if voluntary
of Services (CHINS)
are those tools. 9' A

(a) Who is beyond the control of his or her parent such that
the child's behavior endangers the health, safety, or welfare of the
child or other person;
(b) Who has been reported to law enforcement as absent
without consent for at least twenty-four consecutive hours from the
parent's home, a crisis residential center, an out-of-home placement,
or a court-ordered placement on two or more separate occasions; and
(i) Has exhibited a substance abuse problem; or
(ii) Has exhibited behaviors that create a serious risk of harm
to the health, safety, or welfare of the child or any other person; or

86. Id.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.130(1).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.095.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.044(1).

90. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.042(b). The parent of the child, however, has the power
to disband a multidisciplinary team unless a Child in Need of Services petition has been filed on
that child by DSHS. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.042(c).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.030(3).
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(c) (i) Who is in need of necessary services, including food,
shelter, health care, clothing, educational, or services designed to
maintain or reunite the family;
(ii) Who lacks access, or has declined, to utilize these
services; and
(iii) Whose parents have evidenced continuing but unsuccessful efforts to maintain the family structure or are unable2 or
unwilling to continue efforts to maintain the family structure.1
An ARY is defined as:
a juvenile:
(a) who is absent from home for at least seventy-two consecutive hours without consent of his or her parent;
(b) who is beyond the control of his or her parent such that the
child's behavior endangers the health, safety, or welfare of the child
or any person; or
(c) who has a substance abuse problem for which there are no
pending criminal charges related to the substance abuse.93
A child, parent or DSHS may file a CHINS petition alleging that a
child is a CHINS.9 4 ARY petitions may only be filed by a parent.9 5
Pursuant to the determination that a child is a CHINS, the court
may enter an order requiring the child to reside in out-of-home
placement for up to ninety days. 96 Pursuant to the determination that
a child is an ARY, the court orders the child to reside in the home. 97
Once a child is adjudicated a CHINS or an ARY, the court may enter
a dispositional plan which will require the child to complete services
aimed at assisting the family in resolving the conflict, require school
attendance, and require the child to refrain from running away from
court ordered placement.9" A child may be held in contempt of court
for failing to abide by the dispositional order of his or her CHINS or

92. Id.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.030(1). At-risk youths were actually designated by the
Legislature in 1990. Family Reconciliation Act, ch. 276, § 3, 1990 Wash. Laws 1579 (1990)
(amended 1995).
94. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.32A.140, 150 (1995).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.191.
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.179(3).
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.192(2). This statute does allow for out of home placement
as well, but only if agreed upon by the parents. Id.
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.179(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.32A.196(2)(a)-(e).
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ARY petition. 9 The remedy for such contempt is a fine or imprisonment for up to seven days in a juvenile detention facility.'00
One final provision of the Bill, which may strengthen the Becca
Bill's effectiveness, is a new section which provides that no court may
decline to accept a properly filed ARY petition or CHINS petition.1"'
Therefore, even though ARY petitions were made available as a
parental tool in 1990,1°2 most counties had refused to hear them
because of scarce resources and crowded courts.0 3 Under the current
law, nobody who files an ARY or a CHINS petition will be turned
away.
In sum, the most controversial change from the law prior to the
Becca Bill is the allowance for five days of secure detainment. The
lack of a longer lockup provision is attributable to Governor Lowry's
veto of a large portion of the Bill. Governor Lowry's vetoes are
addressed in the next section.
4.

The 180-day Lockup For Habitual Runaways

The version of the Becca Bill which was eventually passed was not
the only version before the Legislature. The controversy over the
runaway issue in Washington prompted five different proposals in both
the House and the Senate.' °4 The most controversial of Senate Bill
5439's (the Becca Bill) competitors was House Bill 1417. House Bill
1417 advocated a "habitual runaway" provision which allowed for the
detention of a juvenile for up to six months in a secure facility.'

99. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.250 dictates that a child or a parent who fails to abide by
the court order will be subject to contempt proceedings.
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.32A.250(3).
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.32A.205.
102. Family Reconciliation Act, ch. 276 § 3,1990 Wash. Laws 1579 (1990) (amended 1995).
103. Interview with Deborah Lippold, attorney, Pierce County Department of Assigned
Counsel, in Tacoma, Washington (July 3, 1996).
104. S. 5439, S. 5480, S. 5191, S. 5649, H.R. 1417, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995).
The four Senate bills differed only slightly from each other, varying for example on the
definition of a secure CRC or the number of days a child could be held in a secure CRC. House
bill 1417 was significantly more severe and advocated up to a year detention for chronic runaways.
105. H.R. 1417, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12 (1995) provides:
If a child has run away from his or her parent's home three times in a twelve month
period, the court shall enter a finding that the child is at risk and the court on its own
motion shall detain the child in a secure facility or other court ordered treatment
program for a period not to exceed six months. The department shall develop a
program for of education and services for the child and family to address the cause of
the child's behavior.
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House Bill 1417 also made no provision for CHINS, despite the urging
of the Attorney General's office." 6
The portion of the House Bill pertaining to the habitual runaway
provision was incorporated into Senate Bill 5439 and was passed by the
Legislature as a compilation of the two bills. Upon arriving at
Governor Lowry's desk, however, the habitual runaway provision was
vetoed because the Governor had numerous concerns about the
provision's potential effects upon the juvenile justice system.0 7
First, the Governor expressed concern that due process would be
violated by finding that a child is a habitual runaway without requiring
this allegation to be pled and proved during a fact-finding hearing.'0 8
Second, Governor Lowry was bothered by the fact that the habitual
runaway provision gave courts almost unlimited discretion.' °9 Third,
the Governor was dissatisfied with the habitual runaway portion of the
Becca Bill because the Bill appeared too punishment-oriented, in
contrast to the overall treatment-oriented focus of the legislation."'
Fourth, Governor Lowry was troubled by how much this provision
would cost the State of Washington, stating that the funds would be
put to better use by targeting the Bill's more treatment-oriented

106. Letter from Christine Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, to Representatives
Carrell, Cooke, and Thibaudeau (Feb. 13, 1995) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
107. Veto Message from Governor Mike Lowry, May 10, 1995, at 2.
Actually, the Governor vetoed several sections of the bill. Among those vetoed were Section
9, which provided for parental contribution of $50 per day to the CRC where their child is
placed; Section 31, which required the suspension of a driver's license for any child designated
an habitual runaway (vetoed because the habitual runaway portion was vetoed); Section 33, which
required permanency placement evaluations to be completed pursuant to out of home placements
under CHINS petitions; Section 35, which would have made it a misdemeanor for a CRC
administrator not to notify the child's parent, police or DSHS within eight hours of the child's
placement; Section 38, which would have required CRC administrators to request from DSHS
names of any siblings of the youth admitted who are under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
rehabilitation administration or who are the subject of a dependency proceeding (declaring this
to be too great an intrusion on the child's privacy); Section 50, which required that treatment
providers notify parents within 48 hours that their minor child has voluntarily requested substance
abuse treatment (declaring that this provision violated the confidentiality of alcohol and drug
abuse records); Sections 51 and 57, which stated that school district personnel were not permitted
to refer minors to drug treatment unless they notified the minor's parents; Section 55, which
required treatment providers to notify parents that their child has voluntarily sought outpatient
mental health treatment (declaring that it will deter children from seeking help); Section 59,
technical changes in WASH. REV. CODE § 64 (1994), which disallowed for the use of specialized
foster homes as CRCs (semisecure); and Sections 76-80, which revoked driving privileges to
students who have substantially failed to carry out their attendance responsibilities.
108. Veto Message, supra note 107, at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id. Governor Lowry stated, "By locking up young people as a sanction for running
away from home, this section essentially recriminalizes this conduct. Such an effect is dearly
contrary to the intent of treating troubled youth, and not punishing runaways." Id.

Becca Bill

1996]

provisions. 1 ' Finally, Governor Lowry asserted that the habitual
runaway provision was unnecessary in light of other parental tools
containedwithin the Bill. The Governor felt that the five-day holding
that the habitual runaway
period in a secure CRC was sufficient and
112
necessary.
not
was
detainment
six month
The Legislature was unable to get the votes it needed to override
Governor Lowry's veto. What was left of the Bill after the veto is
accused of satisfying no one. On the one hand, advocates for parental
authority and maximum child detainment are frustrated that they do
not have the peace of mind associated with the provision for long term
detainment under the habitual runaway portion. On the other hand,
juvenile rights advocates, who feel strongly that status offenders should
be completely free from secure detainment, must contend with the fiveday lockup provision." 3 The parental advocacy groups and the
senators who support their causes vowed to return with the proposal
provision again in the 1996 legislative session,
for the 180-day lockup
14
so."
do
to
failed
but
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE BECCA BILL

Although there are many controversial issues which arise when
discussing policies of juvenile justice, the remainder of this Comment
addresses three major problems that Washington is facing in imple111. Veto Message, supra note 107, at 3.
112. Id. "This brief 'hold' period provides parents with the opportunity to reestablish
contact with their runaway child (where such contact is not inappropriate) and to obtain services
or other assistance that might be helpful in resolving the family conflict." Id.
113. Parental rights groups were among those opposed to Lowry's veto. Children's rights
groups and community service providers were frustrated with even the five-day lockup provision.
For instance, the Washington Council on Crime and Delinquency expressed opposition to the
five-day lockup in a letter to Senator Hargrove and members of the committee responsible for the
bill's drafting. The letter stated, in part,
The [Washington Council on Crime and Delinquency] has recently reaffirmed our
longstanding general position in opposition to recriminalizing status offenses and
recommends that such behaviors as running away and truancy be addressed through
enforcement of current statutes and improved services.
Letter from Larry M. Fehr, Executive Director, Washington Council on Crime and Delinquency,
to Senator Hargrove and members of the Committee (Feb. 1, 1995) (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
114. The proposed bill before the 1996 legislature, to amend the 1995 Becca Bill, did not
contain an habitual runaway provision despite promises to the contrary. Perhaps sensing
Governor Lowry's opposition to such a provision, Senator Mike Carrell has decided to wait until
a more favorable political climate exists in Washington before revitalizing it. Senator Mike Carrell
(R-Lakewood), in reference to his plan to push the 180-day lockup rule again, stated: "We have
tried to address [Lowry's] concerns-and I personally feel that they are bogus-about due
process." Key Issues Confronting the 1996 Session, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, January 7, 1996, at
A12.
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menting the Becca Bill. Those three issue are: (1) complaints that the
law has thus far accomplished none of its goals; (2) the potential loss
of federal funds for JJDP Act violations; and (3) the potential for great
increases in contempt of court proceedings for juveniles who disregard
their CHINS or ARY dispositional orders.
A.

One Year on the Books: How is the Becca Bill Working?

Despite its popular support in both the House and the Senate," 5
implementation of the Becca Bill has fallen short of lawmakers'
expectations. This section explores how the Bill has been working,
based primarily on statements from practitioners in Pierce County,
Washington.
The Becca Bill was intended to give parents the tools to regain
control of their teenagers, whether runaway or not. However, there are
complaints that the Bill is not accomplishing the goals it set out to
achieve." 6 The tool of choice since the passage of the Becca Bill has
been the ARY petition." 7 Intended for parents who desire to control
their child under their own roof,"' ARY petitions have had their
effectiveness tested in court over the past year." 9
DSHS social workers have found that while they have seen a few
success stories with the filing of ARY petitions, often times dragging

115. The Becca Bill was passed by a vote of 90-6 in the House and 45-1 in the Senate.
Certificate of Enrollment, Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5439, 54th Leg. Reg. Sess.
(1995).
116. C.R. Roberts, Mother Finds Becca Bill of No Help in Getting Runaway Daughte Home,
TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, March 3, 1996, at B1. A mother, faced with a runaway daughter
"tells the story of a week filled with nightmares, of a week spent discovering that this thing called
the Becca Bill offers nowhere near the solutions proponents proclaim." Id.
117. While the ARY petition was available before the passage of the Becca Bill, many county
courts in Washington were not hearing them because of a lack of resources. Interview with
Lippold, supra note 103.
There is now a provision which states that no county may decline to hear a properly filed
ARY petition, so all county courts are again hearing them. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.205.
118. While out of home placement is available under the dispositional plan for ARYs, most
people who use the petition want the child in the house, obeying the rules. If a parent does not
want the child in the house, a voluntary placement agreement which provides for out of home
placement has always been an option for parents. CHINS petitions, filed much less often than
ARYs, have been used when the child is on the run and the parents have indicated a lack of
interest in the child. While CHINS can be filed by the parents, they are more often filed by the
department, or the child when it is clear that the child has no place to go. Interview with Ann
Kaluzny, Lori McDonald, and Bill Bendixen, social workers for Family Reconciliation Services,
in Tacoma, Washington (July 1, 1996).
119. Filings in the juvenile courts of Washington for noncriminal proceedings increased by
41.7% in 1995, due in part by an increase in filings of ARY and CHINS petitions. CASELOADS
OF THE COURTS OF WASHINGTON 1995, 37 (Office of the Administrator of the Courts ed.,
1996).
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the family into court has caused situations to worsen. 2 ' By pitting
child against parent in an adversarial forum, the focus becomes not
what the child needs, but who is the winner and who is the loser in an
ongoing power struggle. 2 ' Additionally, few, if any, ARY petitions
are ever denied,' causing the child to feel trapped and persecuted.
Furthermore, dispositional orders pursuant to ARY petitions often end
up being extensive lists of what the parents want from the child while
the child lives under their roof. 2 ' The focus is more on ordering the
child to follow the rules than on providing services to remedy the
problem.'24 While practitioners in the field have been sympathetic
to parents' utter frustration in trying to maintain a normal child-parent
relationship, there is a sense that creating a parent out of the court is
not the answer.' 2 5
Additionally, the juvenile court commissioners have required
social workers from DSHS to be present in court for the families'
dispositional plan following approval of the ARY petition, 26 as well

as at all review hearings and contempt proceedings for noncompliance.
This causes DSHS social workers to be in court more than they are in
the office helping families, thereby burdening scarce resources. 2 7 It
has also placed an extra party into an already tense situation.'2 8
Another complaint is that the Bill is too confusing and ambiguous
to be effective. 2 9 Presented as a compromise between competing
interests, the Becca Bill is criticized as being a politically popular move

120. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118.
121. Id. Ms. McDonald stated, "It is really a frustrating place to be when you're trying
honestly to be helpful to families. To get into an arena where there is a win-lose atmosphere...
we don't win or lose with families. You mediate, you negotiate, you compromise." Id.
122. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103; interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen
supra note 118.
123. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103. Some typical orders on an ARY dispositional
order may include no profane language, no incoming calls, and no drug use.
124. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103. Ms. Lippold states, "I personally think the
statute is bad .. the parents can't control the kid and so the court is supposed to?" Id.
125. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103. "You often times get a sense of the parents'
frustration. They truly are at their wits end.... I think this gives parents a false sense that this
is going to fix things and it doesn't. The cases I've been involved in, it makes it worse." Id.
126. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118.
127. Id. Ms. Kaluzny stated, "Now half my unit is in court on Thursday mornings. That's
a lot of time and a lot of resources in court." Id. Ms. McDonald added, "We serve between 130
and 150 families per year. If you're in court two or three times a week, you're not helping
families." Id.
128. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118.
129. Id.; C.R. Roberts, supra note 116, at B1 (quoting Seattle Attorney Yvonne Ward, "The
Becca Bill is over 100 pages long. It's an octopus .... ").

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 20:125

with no practical benefits. 3 ' In addition, parents are often entirely
misinformed as to the Bill's provisions, causing frustration and
confusion.131
The most controversial of the Becca Bill's provisions, the secure
detainment in CRCs, has not yet been tested. Secure CRCs are not
yet available, even after a year on the books. 32 Funding for secure
CRCs has only recently been made available, and their construction is
now underway.' 33 A common consensus among practitioners is that
34
when locked facilities are available, things will only get worse.'
Currently, all children utilizing the nonsecure CRCs run by DSHS are
offered a wide range of voluntary services. 3 ' Reaching a child, and
by association, a family, often occurs in the CRC when the child
acknowledges that the workers there can offer something that he or she
needs. 36 Social workers believe it is less likely that children will
acknowledge that the CRC has the services it needs if they see bars on
the windows.1 37 One practitioner noted that legislators "fail to
appreciate the message of a locked door. "138
Social workers also fear that the lockup provision will discourage
runaways from seeking the voluntary services they need out of a fear
of being detained against their will. Immediately after the Becca Bill's
passage, shelters experienced a substantial decrease in runaways seeking
belief that the fivevoluntary services, due in part to a commonly-held
139
day lockups were to be effective immediately.
130. Roberts, supra note 116. "[The Becca Bill] is a joke. It was a politically correct bill,
and I think it makes false promises .... ." Id. (quoting Bonnie Kenigson, Vice Principal at
Puyallup's E.B. Walker High School).
131. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118. Family Reconciliation
Services has had parents calling the intake line inquiring about when they can lock up their
teenagers. Id.
132. Elaine Williams, Out of Bounds' Becca Bill's Provisions Opening New Avenues for
Bringing Wayward Teens In -Bounds, but Lack of CrisisCenters, Legal Issues Threaten Effectiveness,
LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE, May 19, 1996, at 1A.
133. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118.
134. Id. Ms. McDonald stated, "all the lockup will do is set up more challenges for these
kids." Id.
135. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Telephone interview with Mary Ann Murphy, manager, Center for Child Abuse and
Neglect (July 29, 1996).
139. Kery Murakami, New Law Keeping Runaways From Help-Shelters Report Fewer Kids
Coming For Aid, SEATTLE TIMES, July 28, 1995, at B1. "You tend to think of street kids as
defiant. If you force them into a situation, you could see them become even more defiant." Id.
"I can tell you that right after the Bill was signed in this area at least, all of the service providers
noticed a quick drop in the number of kids seeking service." Nancy Amidei of Partnership for
Youth, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (television broadcast, May 14, 1996).

Becca Bill

1996]

A final concern over the Becca Bill is that counties do not have
the resources to implement it. 40 With the ARY petitions, CHINS
petitions, and truancy proceedings, court resources have been pushed
to the limit.' 41 While practitioners have seen the rare case where a
child, when faced with an ARY or CHINS petition, realizes that he or
she is out of control and needs help, it has been the exception rather
than the rule.

142

B. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
A large concern voiced before the Becca Bill's passage was whether
or not Washington was exceeding its authority under the JJDP Act of
1974.13 As discussed above, 144 the JJDP Act conditions receipt of
monies for juvenile justice programs on compliance with its man4
dates.1
The portion of the JJDP Act relevant to the passage of the Becca
Bill is the mandate requiring the deinstitutionalization of the status
offender. The JJDP Act mandates that no status offender may be held
in a secure detention facility. 46 There is, however, a temporary hold
exception to the JJDP Act. This exception allows status offenders to
be held for up to twenty-four hours, excluding weekends and holidays,

Senator Mike Carrell, one of the main sponsors of the Bill, asserts that if some youths choose
not to seek help because of the law, "that's life." Kery Murakami, New Law Keeping Runaways
from Help-Shelters Report Fewer Kids Coming For Aid, SEATTLE TIMES, July 28, 1995, at B1.
140. Many of the complaints about difficulties in implementing the Becca Bill have been
related to the truancy reporting requirements. Judith Billings, state superintendent of public
schools, was reported as saying, "our low estimate (for implementing the Becca Bill) was $12
million a year, based on the number of truancies districts normally reported." Debbie Cafazzo,
Districts Squeezed to Fund Projects Mandated by Federal and State Laws, TACOMA NEWS
TRIBUNE, Jan. 28, 1996, at A10.
141. Susan Bymes, County's Juvenile Services Squeezed, SEATTLE TIMES, May 1, 1996, at
BI; Debbie Cafazzo, Districts Squeezed to Fund Projects Mandated by Federal and State Laws,
TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Jan. 28, 1996, at A10. Pierce County has seen about 75 ARY and
CHINS petitions between September, 1995 and June, 1996 and their frequency has been
escalating. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103. Cf. CASELOADS OF THE COURTS OF
WASHINGTON, supra note 119, at 37 (indicating a substantial rise in juvenile court caseloads due
in part to an increase in ARY petitions).
142. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 118. Ms. McDonald stated,
"It's the bright, strong-willed kids that you want to use all of your clinical power to steer them
in the right way and it's those kids that say, 'I'm not going to do this .... those kids can be really
neat kids if you approach them in a different way. But any.., teenager that you present with
a power struggle is probably going to take you up on it."' Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5633 (1995).
144. See supra Part II.C.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 5633.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(aX12)(A).
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release to parents, or
for purposes of identification, investigation,
147
transfer to a nonsecure program.
Another exception to the JJDP Act's no lockup rule is that a
status offender may be held in a juvenile detention facility longer than
twenty-four hours if a status offender is found to violate a valid court
order. 4 ' In order for a state to invoke this exception, the juvenile
must have received all constitutional due process protections at the
initial adjudication and must be afforded a detention hearing within
twenty-four hours. In addition, prior to a dispositional commitment
to secure placement, a public agency other than a court or law
enforcement agency must have reviewed the juvenile's behavior and
possible alternatives to secure placement, and submitted a written
report to the court.149
Washington came into compliance with the JJDP Act beginning
in 1975, soon after the Act was passed. ° The State currently
receives approximately 1.8 million dollars per year through the Act's
formula grants program. 5' According to the United States Department of Justice, until 1995, Washington had successfully implemented
each of the two original core requirements to deinstitutionalize status
offenders. 2
However, in a recent letter from the Department of Justice to
Washington's DSHS program coordinator, 53 a warning was given
which notified Washington that it would lose all federal funding under
the JJDP Act if the Becca Bill was enacted as passed. 4 The Department of Justice asserted that if the provisions of the Becca Bill were
signed into law by Governor Lowry, "past accomplishments, current
efforts, and future resources awarded to the State and its local units of
government to provide appropriate prevention and intervention services
In light of the Bill's habitual runaway
would be jeopardized."'
180-day lockup section (which was vetoed subsequent to the letter) and
147. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303 (1995).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
149. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(f)(2)(iv).
150. Letter from John J. Wilson, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department of Justice to
Rosalie McHale, Program Coordinator, Juvenile Justice Section, Department of Social and Health
Services 2 (May 2,1995) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
151. Telephone interview with Murphy, supra note 138.
152. Letter from Wilson, supra note 56, at 1.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. At the time of the letter, the bill was in its form as passed by the Legislature which
included a 180-day lockup provision for habitual runaways. This portion was vetoed by Governor
Lowry so the only lockup provision that remains is the maximum five-day secure facility
assessment period. Veto Message, supra note 107, at 3.
155. Letter from Wilson, supra note 56, at 3.
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the five day temporary holding provision in a secure CRC, the
Department of Justice stated that it found it "reasonable to anticipate
that Washington will not be able to demonstrate full compliance with
the deinstitutionalization provision ... of the JJDP Act, if [the Becca
Bill] is enacted and implemented.' 1 6 The Department of Justice
recommended that instead of allowing for a five day secure lockup
provision, Washington should limit the time in detention to the
permitted twenty-four hours for the purposes of identification,
investigation, release to parents, or transfer to a nonsecure facility."5 7
The Department of Justice also encouraged Washington to utilize the
"valid court order" exception to deal with chronic runaways through
contempt of court findings that would afford the juvenile all due
process rights.'
Despite the Department of Justice's contentions, Christine
Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, applauds Washington's
efforts to pass the Becca Bill"5 9 and maintains that Washington
remains in compliance with the JJDP Act. 60 Attorney General
Gregoire maintains that the Bill does not violate the JJDP Act because
Governor Lowry vetoed the habitual runaway portion and because of
the legislation's treatment-oriented approach. Attorney General
Gregoire asserts that the secure CRCs do not constitute juvenile
detention facilities and "the federal law ... cited has never been a
or mental
barrier to assessment of children for chemical dependency
61
health problems, even in secure settings if necessary. '
Attorney General Gregoire also indicated that Washington was
fully prepared to litigate an action brought by the Department of
Justice to repeal federal funds, but hoped a resolution could be reached
in a less litigious manner. 6 ' Because the CRCs which provide for
the secure detainment have not yet been built, the Federal Act has not
officially been violated. At last report, the state had agreed to accept

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Letter from Christine Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington to John J. Wilson,
Deputy Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department
of Justice 3 (July 21, 1995) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review) (stating that "[the
Becca Bill] represents a considered and rational attempt to reflect the level of dangerousness on
the streets, and the true needs of the child and family").
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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technical assistance from the Department
of Justice to implement the
163
Bill so as not to violate the JJDP Act.
Without the 180-day habitual runaway provision, Washington
does stand a better chance of retaining federal funding. However, it is
difficult to accept Attorney General Gregoire's claim that the lockup
provision as it stands does not violate the JJDP Act. The Act provides
that no status offender can be held in a secure detention or confinement.'" The locking doors and windows on the CRCs are fairly
characterized as confinement. Although the articulated legislative
purpose behind detention in the secure CRCs is not punishment, but
assessment and treatment, this purpose does not counter the fact that
juveniles are locked up. Characterizing incarceration as treatment
rather than punishment has been criticized before, in the post "childsaving" era. 165

Due to the approximate ten million dollar cost of implementing
the Bill, 66 the State should be very careful about placing an even
greater burden on taxpayers by violating the JJDP Act. The JJDP Act
does allow for temporary confinement for up to twenty-four hours. It
is, therefore, not clear why Washington would instead insist on a fiveday detention at the risk of losing federal funds. Since, under the Bill,
an assessment must be made when the child is first brought into the
CRC, 167 the State could amend the Becca Bill to require only a
twenty-four hour detainment in order to comply with the JJDP Act.
However, with the State's insistence on the five-day provision,
Washington is jeopardizing federal funding for a minimal amount of
time gained in lockup facilities.
C.

Contempt of Court and the Status Offender: The Becca Bill
Makes BootstrappingEasier
One of the most interesting aspects of status offense jurisdiction
in Washington is the juvenile court's authority over juveniles through
contempt of court provisions. The juvenile court has always had
authority to exercise its contempt provisions to force juveniles under
its jurisdiction into compliance with placement, school attendance, or

163. Telephone interview with Murphy, supra note 138.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
165. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
166. COMMITTEE FILE, COSTS OF MAJOR FEATURES OF THE BILL. The estimated cost
under the bill as originally passed, which included the 180-day lockup for habitual runaways, was
estimated at about 40 million dollars. Id.
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.130(2)(a)(i).
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other court orders.16 While the contempt power will be exercised
more frequently since the passage of the Becca Bill,' 69 it is not a new
authority of the court under the 1995 law. 70
After the 1974 JJDP Act was passed, states that were part of the
Act's formula grants program did not have the power to incarcerate
status offenders through contempt proceedings.' 7' In 1980, in spite
of opposition from many youth advocacy and services groups, the Act
secure detention of status offenders who violate
was amended to permit
172
valid court orders.
Through a contempt proceeding, a status offender, formerly a
noncriminal minor, can be "bootstrapped" into a juvenile delinquent
by being held in criminal contempt. 173 The following is an example
of how the contempt proceeding operates under the Becca Bill: A child
is taken to a secure CRC for the five-day holding period by policeinitiated action or by a report from the parents that the child is
missing. If the parents wish to order the child to remain in the home,
or if DSHS would like to place the child outside the home, a CHINS
or an ARY petition may be filed on that child. If the child is
adjudicated a CHINS or an ARY, then the court, based on a social
worker's recommendation, enters a dispositional order. The order may
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.250. The statute states:
(1) In all child in need of services proceedings and at-risk youth proceedings, the court
shall verbally notify the parents and the child of the possibility of a finding of contempt
for failure to comply with the terms of a court order entered pursuant to this chapter.
The court shall treat the parents and the child equally for the purposes of applying
contempt of court processes and penalties under this section.
Id.
The power of a court to exercise its contempt power is not a new one. Historically, courts
have been allowed great discretion in the utilizing of contempt powers against one "whose conduct
" 17
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard ..
AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 2 (1990); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962):
We start with the premise that the right of courts to conduct their business in an
untrammeled way lies at the foundation of our system of government and that courts
necessarily must possess the means of punishing for contempt when conduct tends
directly to prevent the discharge of their functions.
169. Pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE 13.32A.205, courts cannot decline to hear CHINS or
ARY petitions. This, combined with the hysteria over runaways, will probably result in more
juveniles coming under the jurisdiction of the court, which will logically produce more court
orders to be violated.
170. Contempt proceedings have been available since 1981, coinciding with the valid court
order exception to the JJDP Act.
171. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
1112 (1974) (amended 1980).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1995).
173. See generally Jan C. Costello and Nancy L. Worthington, IncarceratingStatus Offenders:
Attempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 41 (1981).
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require the child to remain in placement or in the home, to attend
school, to go to counseling, and to comply with other rules deemed
necessary by the parents or DSHS. If the child runs from home or
placement, the parent or DSHS can bring a show cause order'74
alleging the child to be in contempt. The child, after a finding of
contempt, can be placed in a juvenile detention facility for seven
days.' 75 Then the child will be released to the home or the placement. If the child runs away again, the cycle is perpetuated and the
lockups continue.
The potential for unlimited contempt power casts serious doubt
on Washington's commitment to confining juveniles only for "treatment purposes." Although the five-day detention in a secure CRC is
controversial, it does not deserve as much attention as the potential for
misuse of the court's contempt power through the seven day incarcerations. The practice of bootstrapping, which has been used since 1980,
17 6
has already been exercised more liberally under the Becca Bill.
The struggle with the proper role of contempt in a court's
jurisdiction over the status offender is not an isolated one. California
also has grappled with the issue of respecting the inherent contempt
power of the juvenile court while still maintaining a commitment to the
deinstitutionalization of the status offender. In the case of In re Ronald
S.,177 a minor was adjudged a status offender. 17 1
The juvenile
court judge ordered Ronald S. to remain in nonsecure placement, and
when he ran, reclassified him as a juvenile delinquent and held him in
contempt of court. 79 He was detained in a secure juvenile detention
facility. 80 Because California law prohibited secure detention of
runaways, this practice was the only means the judge had of incarcerating him.181 The child petitioned for habeas corpus and it was

174. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(1), a contemnor must be afforded notice and
hearing of charges. A show cause order provides notice to the alleged contemnor of the allegation
and allows him an opportunity to be heard. Burlingame v. Consolidated Mines and Smelting Co.,
Ltd., 106 Wash. 2d 328, 335, 722 P.2d 67, 71 (1986).
175. WASH. REV. CODE 13.32A.250(3).
176. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103.
177. 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
178. California's status offenders are classified as "601 Wards" since the relevant statute is
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (1996). A 601 ward falls under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court if he "persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or
directions of his or her parents ... or ... is beyond the control [of his parents] .
Id. at

§ 601(a).
179. Ronald S., 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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granted.'82 The California Court of Appeals criticized the juvenile
court's decision to change a status offender into a juvenile delinquent
simply because he walked out of a foster home.'8 3 The court found
that the juvenile court's actions made California's provisions aimed at
deinstitutionalizing the status offender meaningless. 8 4 Therefore, the
power was inapplicable to
court held that the criminal contempt
85
juvenile status offense proceedings.
A few years after the Ronald S. opinion, a California court
reconsidered the broad holding of the case in In re Michael G."8 6
The Michael G. court, in modifying the Ronald S. decision, found that
the court's contempt power lay in a more general contempt provision,
and existed independently of a statute disallowing secure detention for
status offenders.' 87 The Michael G. court concluded that the reclassification of the status offender as a delinquent through the contempt
Otherwise, the
process was the only thing that was objectionable.'
court held:
there is nothing in [the] history which specifically indicates that the
Legislature intended to prohibit a juvenile court from enforcing
obedience to a court order through a contempt sanction that does
not alter the status of the ward." 9
When faced with the issue, other states have generally supported
a court's inherent power of contempt.'"0 For example, Colorado has
held that it is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the

182. Id. at 393.
183. Id. at 392.
184. The Ronald S. court held that by exercising its contempt power in this way, "[tihe
court would be doing by indirection that which cannot be done directly. As the law now stands,
the Legislature has said that if a [Section] 601 [ward] wants to run, let him run. While this may
be maddening, baffling and annoying to the juvenile court judge, ours is not to question the
wisdom of the Legislature." Id.
185. Id.
186. 747 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1988).
187. Id.at 1159.
188. Id.at 1158.
189. Id. at 1159. The court also questioned whether the Legislature could so severely limit
the inherent contempt power of the court. The Michael G. court found authority for their
position from the JJDP Act's valid court order amendment, passed in 1980, which had not existed
at the time of the Ronald S. decision. Id. at 1160-61.
190. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); Interest of D.L.D., 327 N.W.2d
682 (Wis. 1983); Interest of Darlene C., 301 S.E.2d 136 (S.C. 1983); Baker v. Baker, 376 N.E.2d
1005 (I11.1978); In re G.B. 430 N.E.2d 1096 (111.1981).
A minority of states have disapproved the practice. See, e.g., W.M. v. State, 437 N.E.2d
1028 (Ind. 1982); Interest of Tasseing H., 422 A.2d 530 (Pa. 1980); A.A. v. State, 604 So. 2d 813
(Fla. 1991).
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legislature to disallow a court to use its contempt power. 191 On the
other hand, Florida is a leader in respecting the rights of the juvenile
over the court's contempt power. In the case of A.A. v. State of
Florida,192 the court stated:
• . . (c]hildren in need of services are not criminals . . . the acts of
contempt committed by the dependent children in this case
constituted running away from home and refusing to go to school.

These acts are ones that the legislature deems a sign of children in
need of services, not children in need of punishment.'93

In contrast, what little Washington law exists on the subject honors the
court's contempt power at the expense of the status offender's
freedom.' 94 Washington, however, agrees with California in dictating
that a status offender cannot be relabeled a "delinquent" through a
court's contempt power. 95
Although it is difficult to imagine how a court would encourage
compliance with an order without its contempt power, it is hypocritical
of Washington to emphasize the treatment-oriented aspects of the fiveday lockup in secure CRCs, while at the same time allowing courts to
incarcerate children who are trapped in a cyclical contempt of court
process. The fact that those children are not officially labeled
delinquents is of little comfort, considering the punishment-oriented
approach to their behavior. The Becca Bill deals with runaway
children. Runaway children are bound to violate placement orders.
Practitioners who have been dealing with the increase of contempt
provisions since the passage of the Bill have found that most of the

191. In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 512 (Colo. 1991). The J.E.S. court stated:
[Wihile the legislature may reasonably regulate the procedures the judiciary employs
when exercising the contempt power, it may not unduly limit the sanctions for
contemptuous conduct so as to seriously impair or destroy the courts' contempt power.
Id. But see A.A., 604 So. 2d at 815 (holding that the courts have an inherent power to make a
finding of contempt, but the power may be properly limited by statute).
192. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
193. Id. at 818.
194. State v. Norlund, 31 Wash. App. 725, 728, 644 P.2d 724, 726 (1982). The Norlund
court upheld the contempt power over status offenders, even though the status offense laws in

Washington at the time were among the most liberally deinstitutionalized in the country. It
should be noted, though, that the Norlund court cautioned that the use of contempt should be
exercised only in the most egregious of circumstances. The record, in other words, must
demonstrate that less restrictive alternatives to incarceration have failed. Id.
The less restrictive alternatives position has been used in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., In re
Ann M., 525 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1987).
195. Id. at 729. Accord In re V.G., 11 Wis. 2d 647, 647 (1982) ("a juvenile court is without
jurisdiction to adjudge a child delinquent solely because she is in contempt of court").
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time, an ARY or a CHINS will violate a court order.1 " The secure
detention which results from contempt can often result in more family
disharmony and more behavior problems by the child.' 97
In Pierce County, Washington, the court's use of its contempt
power through ARY petitions has resulted in the incarceration of
juveniles for consecutive seven-day sentences for each section of a court
order violated.' 9 That is, if a child was brought up on contempt
charges for (1) not staying in placement, (2) not going to school, and
(3) not attending court-ordered counseling, Pierce County juvenile
courts have been imposing twenty-one-day contempt sentences in
juvenile detention facilities. 9 9 Such excessive incarceration flies in
the face of the treatment goals the Becca Bill was intended to
achieve. 200
Florida has the right idea in refusing to create a cycle of lockups
for these already troubled youth. The five-day lockup provision
already creates sufficient reason for juveniles to believe the system is
against them. The contempt cycle will only exasperate this belief, and
cause runaways to feel trapped in the system.
While it is unlikely that Washington will undermine the court's
inherent contempt power anytime soon, youth advocates should be
wary of how that power is used. As a result of the current attitude
towards controlling wayward youth, few restrictions are placed on
judges' power to incarcerate juveniles. It is important that judges
actually attempt less restrictive alternatives before resorting to their
incarceration powers.

196. Id.; Interview with Lippold, supra note 118. Mr. Bendixen noted that the availability
of the contempt process is essentially turning parents into probation officers. Id.
197. Interview with McDonald, Kaluzny, Bendixen, supra note 118. Interview with Lippold,
supra note 103. Ms. Lippold noticed that children who were not exhibiting serious runaway
behavior began running longer and farther after encountering contempt incarcerations in the
juvenile detention centers. Id.
198. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103.
199. Id. A parent advocating for such excessive lockup time in the treatment of his ARY
child has petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review of a superior court's
determination that these lockups are excessive. Ms. Lippold predicts that a decision from the
Washington high courts will occur within the year. Id. Ms. McDonald, a social worker,
commented that "a juvenile could get prosecuted for three shopliftings and a car theft" and never
see the inside of a detention facility. Yet children are being incarcerated, sometimes as long as
49 days, for not attending school. Interview with Kaluzny, McDonald, Bendixen, supra note 115.
Ms. Lippold noted that at times the order violated was something as minor as using profane
language, or receiving incoming calls in the home. Interview with Lippold, supra note 103.
200. Practitioners have noted that the contempt cycle is unlikely to coerce desired behavior
out of the child. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Historically, status offenders have been subject to the tug-of-war
between the state's exercise of its right as parens patriae,and the child's
right to be free from incarceration and court intervention for noncriminal acts. While jurisdiction over status offenders is nothing new, the
Becca Bill, with its provision for a five-day lockup, moves Washington
out of the progressive deinstitutionalization track of the 1977 legislation
and back to the failed turn-of-the-century "child-saving" approach to
juvenile justice.
Even more disturbing than the Becca Bill as implemented is the
movement toward the warehousing of juveniles and the power given to
parents through the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Not only does
the Becca Bill raise issues for the State regarding financial penalties and
practical inefficiencies, but it raises questions about the future of
Washington's status offense laws and the possible passage of a 180-day
lockup provision.
Youth advocates and taxpayers should be indignant about the
potential cost of implementing the Bill, which includes the price tag on
secure CRCs and the potential loss of federal funding. Advocates for
juvenile rights also should be distressed about the effect the five-day
secure lockup will have on our state's juvenile population. And the
activism should not stop there. Perhaps more shocking than the fiveday lockup is the juvenile court's unlimited power to use of contempt
of court provisions. Such contempt actions need to be kept in greater
check than they have been to date. Similarly, effort needs to be placed
in lobbying efforts to block the passage of a stronger bill, which would
bring Washington full circle back to the archaic turn-of-the-century
approach to juvenile justice.
Would the Becca Bill have saved Becca? No one will ever know
for sure. What is apparent, however, is that the Becca Bill has not
provided the answer for families with severe problems, like the
Hedmans. The lockup provision may have helped the Hedmans to
reestablish contact with Becca; however, that again would have been a
temporary remedy, likely to cause resentment and fear in the mind of
an already seriously troubled child. Indeed, one wonders if the
Legislature has truly acted in the best interest of troubled children such
as Becca, or, instead, has merely jumped on the political bandwagon
to endear itself to parents.

